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Abstract 
The paper is devoted to exploration of globalization impact on the Total Factor Productivity on selected EFTA and EU member 
and candidate countries. Based on the constructed longitudinal data, we conclude that globalization spurs TFP with overall 
elasticity more than one. Interferences report that when controlling for changes in domestic R&D expenditures and social 
changes the largest part of the overall impact is imputable to import. Furthermore, our results suggest that social manifestations 
of globalization might be at least as important as R&D expenditures in all sampled social regimes except the liberal one. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Alexandru Ioan Cuza 
University of Iasi. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalization as a multi-faceted phenomenon has been in the center of economic research uninterruptedly 
throughout the last decades. Although its impact on economic growth might have been viewed as positive at first, 
growing body of empirical literature, mostly from the 80’s, on rising inequality and divergence among as within the 
economies challenged this conventional wisdom. In this context, the impact of brain drain (Bénassy and Brezis, 
2013), institutional and social capabilities (Akçomak and terWeel, 2009; Lundvall, 2010) has been stressed. 
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The main focus of the paper is on EU28 member, EFTA (Norway, Switzerland) and selected EU candidate 
(Macedonia, Iceland, Turkey) countries. Obviously, the sample is featured by some diversity – innovation leaders vs. 
innovation laggards (Puskarova, 2012), developed vs. countries in transition – as well as by similarities resulting 
mainly from free trade area, EU integration and growing law harmonization. Furthermore, considering geographical 
localization of technology diffusion (Keller, 2010), and the concentration pattern of innovation leaders and laggards 
in the EU, we may expect significantly high technology flows within the sample. 
When constructing the panel data, we include KOF indices that capture the overall and each of the three 
dimensional effects of globalization in a single proxy. However, we go further and isolate the effects on three flows 
the globalization is commonly referred to (flows of goods and services, flows of labor, flows of capital). We control 
for domestic R&D funding as well as for social capabilities. We suggest these social capabilities to be referred to as 
social capital, and to test their impact in various social regimes. This approach is completely novel to the literature, 
as it is also the testing of simultaneous effects of the three channels of technology flows. 
The paper is structured as follows: first, we explore the current research on the topic. Subsequently, we 
demonstrate the construction of longitudinal data and the model. Then the estimation results are presented and 
confronted with some results from other studies. The Conclusion summarizes the key findings of the paper. 
2. Literature 
In this paper, we are not as much interested in the overall impact of globalization on the Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP), but rather in the impact of its selected dimensions, and determination which ones (one) prevail(s) in 
magnitude and direction. Following the narrow understanding of the concept, globalization might be characterized as 
rising openness to international flows. Thus, we dismantled globalization into flows of goods and services, flows of 
capital and flows of labor, and the residual value where we assume changes in social capital to be dominant (over 
e.g. changes in institutions). The decomposition approach follows conventional wisdom and accords also with the 
composition of KOF indices. 
2.1. Impact of trade 
Recent literature exhibits booming evidence of trade impact on TFP. Limiting the research to the EU area, the 
impact is positive and outperforms in magnitude other channels of technology diffusion (Krammer, 2013). 
In a similar vein, Mendi (2007) finds out that the technology gains from import differ by overall economic output 
and domestic innovation intensity. The world innovation-leading G7 countries seemingly do not benefit, however, 
OECD-not-G7 countries are able to collect significant gains through this channel.  
Bottazzi and Peri (2003) support the thesis at the regional level, and Soukiazis and Antunes(2012) report positive 
and significant interaction between trade and patents as an alternative proxy of technology (Keller, 2010; Puskarova, 
2012).  
Furthermore, Miller andUpadhyay(2000) conclude that it is trade orientation (share of value-added trade) that 
matters for TFP growth. 
2.2. Impact of foreign direct investments 
The impact of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) on TFP is mixed. Earlier studies on EU transition countries 
Damijan et al. (2003) declare that this is imputable to country bias – the effect is significant and positive in Hungary, 
Estonia and Slovenia, and significant and negative in the Czech Republic and Poland. Barbosa and Eiriz (2009) find 
no evidence of either horizontal or vertical spillovers from FDI; Ahmed (2012) finds them negative. However, a 
broad strand of literature supports the hypothesis of positive and significant efficiency gains through the conduit of 
FDI (Keller, 2010; Kemeny, 2010; Krammer, 2013), or more broadly, from openness to international capital flows 
(Kose et al., 2009).  
The meta-analysis of Hanousek et al. (2011) reports direct and indirect FDI effects weakening over time and 
finds the reason in a publication bias and the fact that more sophisticated methods and more controls can be used 
once a sufficient time span is available. They further comment that panel studies are likely to find relatively lower 
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FDI spillover effects. Another meta-analysis (Irsova and Havranek, 2013) yields evidence that horizontal spillovers 
are on average zero, and that their sign and magnitude depend on the characteristics of the domestic country and 
foreign investors that have to dispose of technology advantage vis-à-vis the host country. 
2.3. Impact of human capital migration, social and institutional capabilities 
Lately emerged studies suggest that the positive FDI externalities on TFP are imputable to employees’ migration 
within the multinational corporation (Ford and Rork, 2011; Simonen and McCann, 2008), or newly-formed 
communication channels (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008).  Another strand of literature points out the theorem of 
migration-intensified trade based on the theorem that migration lowers informal barriers to trade (Combes et al., 
2005; Gould, 1994; Javorcik et al., 2011). Nonetheless, inclusion of human capital into a growth regression is 
justified by the theorem of growing returns to human capital investments, aka their non-negligible role in 
convergence trajectories (Cuaresma et al., 2013).  
On the case of the Portuguese economy, Teixeira and Fortuna (2010) conclude that technology gains from FDI 
seems to be strongly dependent on institutional circumstances, namely those related to human capital investments 
and incentives. The hypothesis of dependency of TFP growth on institutional and social capabilities is well-known 
to the literature. Following some earlier work ofAbramovitz (1986), FDI and trade may not discriminate well 
between countries that escaped the low development trap and those that continue to be poor (Fagerberg and Srholec, 
2008; Rodrik et al., 2004). Even though there is some controversy in the issue (following the results of Woo (2009)), 
the role of government and financial institutions should not be neglected what is the core essence of the concept of 
national systems of innovation (Fagerberg et al., 2010; Lundvall, 2010).  
In this paper, we suggest to draw special attention to social capabilities, or more precisely, to globalization-
induced changes in social capital as we expect that migration and culture hybridization might depress its stock 
(Heidenreich, 2003). 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Model 
We start our model by augmented Cobb-Douglas production function (Equation 1). 
   (1) 
where Y stands for aggregate output in the economy (Gross Domestic Product, GDP), Ȝ is the rate of external 
technological change, A is the constant. L and K stand for labor and physical capital employed in the 
production,respectively. RD denotes all research and development expenditures that include all domestic R&D 
investments (DRD), as well as funding of domestic R&D coming from abroad (FRD). SC represents social capital 
accumulated in the economy and its final effect is defined by the volume of social capital accumulated within the 
economy (more or less constant due to its long-run formation with respect to traditions, values, culture) and by its 
transitive element that emerges with migration, culture mixing, etc. Following this assumption, we suggest 
attributing this transitive element solely to impact of globalization denoted by Sglob.  
Decomposition of the globalization effect follows the Equation 2. Trade (T) captures flows of goods and services, 
FDIstand for flows of capital, and migration of human capital (HCM) captures the relevant part of flows of labor. In 
addition, we control for R&D expenditures coming from abroad (FRD) and changes in social capital(dSC). FRD 
reflect possibilities to accumulate capital for domestic R&D activities from abroad and in the EU context, this 
measure indicates also ability to participate in EU structural funding. Difference in social capital (dSC), on the other 
hand, captures the social reaction to globalizing society and hybridization of cultures Heidenreich (2003). 
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   (2) 
Substituting Sglob in Equation 1, resolving it for TFP, and taking logarithms gives us the following equation 
form: 
  (3) 
3.2. Data and their mutual interference 
The panel is constructed on time span through 1995-2010. In the same vein as Lundvall (2010), we proxy trade 
by import (impy), and employ inward FDI stock instead of flows since FDI tend to generate technology gains 
throughout their life and not just in the first year of their provision (fdistock). Due to data availability constraints, 
human capital mobility is measured by a proxy of university student mobility (hcm). Following the empiric 
suggestions (Dreher et al., 2008b; Gemmel et al., 2008), all these proxies are denominated in GDP in order to 
account for relative openness of the economy. The data on import and FDI was derived from UNCTAD Stat and 
data on migration from Eurostat.  
Recently developed KOF indices (Dreher, 2006; revised by Dreher et al., 2008a) capture globalization more 
comprehensively and can be acquired freely from ETH Zürich at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. The overall score 
in KOFglob is calculated based on three sub-indices: 
x KOFecon, which reflects openness to international flows of goods and services, capital and labor (KOFflows), as 
well as tariff and non-tariff restrictions on these flows (KOFrestrictions) 
x KOFsoc, which accounts for social manifestations of globalization namely international information flows 
(KOFinfo), emerging multiculturalism, aka culture proximity (KOFcultpro), and intensity of foreign contacts 
(KOFcontact), and 
x KOFpol, which stands for various political facets of globalization (e.g. policy emulation, integration and 
contracts). 
The data on research and development (R&D) expenditures was extracted from Eurostat Science and Technology 
Database as GERD in purchasing power parity per capita in EUR 2000. TFP has been calculated following Dujava 
(2012).For proper distinction, data innatural logarithm formis denoted by lowercase letters. 
Table 1.Correlation interference 
 tfp rd impy fdistock hcm kofsoc 
tfp 1.0000      
rd .7967 1.0000     
impy -.1085 -.0994 1.0000    
fdistock .1366 .2205 .6585 1.0000   
hcm .3765 .1059 .3637 .2865 1.0000  
kofsoc .6421 .7702 .0442 .3614 .1273 1.0000 
As declared by the correlation matrix (Table 1), tfp correlates most closely with rd and kofsoc. The strong 
correlation between trade and FDI is also not surprising. As Anwar and Nguyen (2011) report, many small or 
middle-size economies open up in order to receive FDI and in such way, to foster growth. However, FDI are 
designed not to serve only the host (possibly small) demand, but are most usually export-oriented, aka producing 
solely intermediate products. In such circumstances, FDI and trade demonstrate high correlation. 
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4. Model estimations 
4.1. Basic model 
Results from first estimations yield impact of technology gains from globalization with elasticity higher than 1. 
Table 2.Regression interference, basic model estimations 
 tfp_model1 tfp_model2 tfp_model3 tfp_model4 tfp_model5 tfp_model6 tfp_model7 
kofglob 1.016***       
 (15.91)       
rd .117*** .213*** .171*** .221*** .163*** .192*** .137*** 
 (8.27) (15.82) (11.68) (16.81) (11.41) (11.80) (8.52) 
fdistock   .0834***  .0295**  .0265** 
   (10.86)  (3.28)  (2.97) 
hcm    .110*** .0952***  .0884*** 
    (8.52) (8.06)  (7.48) 
impy  .278***   .212***  .210*** 
  (8.92)   (6.77)  (6.79) 
kofsoc      .530*** .211*** 
      (7.34) (3.36) 
C -3.054*** -2.001*** .800*** .750*** 1.135*** -1.315*** .376 
 (-13.14) (-20.53) (12.40) (10.93) (14.50) (-5.03) (1.57) 
N 450 449 449 372 371 450 371 
R2 .7045 .6024 .6310  .5941 .6743  .5792  .6849  
ȡ-stat .9604 .9469 .9473 .9354 .9684 .9280 .9698 
Notes: the dependent variable is tfp; *, **, and *** indicate parameters that are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; standard errors 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficients; all estimation models contain fixed effects. 
Following up and decomposing the impact, all the explanatory variables remain positive and highly significant. 
The elasticity on import accounts for more than 0.2 what is comparable to the elasticity of R&D. FDI stock seems to 
lose its power when controlling for trade, but stays positive. The human capital mobility emerges as a highly 
significant conduit of technology explaining app. 10% of the TFP growth. These results are in accordance with the 
previous evidence (Krammer, 2013).  
After controlling for KOFsoc, the magnitude of estimated elasticities does not change. However, the impact of 
KOFsoc deteriorates compared to its estimated value in Model 6 (Table 2) implying, thus, the overall impact of 
KOFsoc to be partially attributable to other channels of technology flows. The estimated elasticity of KOFsoc in 
Model 7 is the same as Ishise and Sawada (2009) report in their model of aggregate returns to social capital.  
Nevertheless, the estimated magnitude of this proxy may still be considered surprisingly large. In the light of 
scarce evidence of social impact on TFP values, we suggest further research on this term. 
4.2. Going further – transition countries vs. innovation leaders 
In this section, we proceed to discrimination between the effects of globalization-induced societal changes 
captured here in KOFsoc in social regimes. We draw on their definition by Esping-Andersen (1990), but upgrade it 
with southern regime following Ferrera (1996). Furthermore, we pool all the other countries into one group calling it 
transition countries where their social regime is disregarded as insignificant. We decided to do so as throughout our 
time span 1995-2010, their social regimes underwent large restructuring phase.  
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Within a social regime, countries share certain social preferences, degree of social protection, and most 
commonly, yield certain level of social capital stock. Thus, we split the countries as follows: 
x social-democratic regime (socdem): Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden 
x conservative regime (cons): Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland 
x liberal regime (lib): Ireland, United Kingdom 
x southern regime (south): Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain 
x regime in transition (trans): Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey.
We expect to detect here two antagonistic innovation systems, one dependent on individualism spurred by 
commonly accepted economic liberalism (liberal one) and another one anchored in tradition of inequality-adverse 
(inequality-fighting) social system nurtured by common trust, tax discipline and efficiency (social-democratic one). 
The both differ considerably in the social capital accumulation (Ishise and Sawada, 2009; Lundvall, 2010).  
First, we run the regressions for the overall impact on social regimes (Table 3). Estimated elasticities report high 
impact of globalization on technology flows into the liberal and transition countries and relatively small into other 
countries. Impact on transition countries can be decomposed using the variables in Table 4.  
However, impact of globalization on liberal countries is difficult to decompose given our variables. KOFsoc 
proves to be significant, but also contradictory working what might be imputable to strong domestic production of 
technology that leak to other countries. In addition, the tradition of liberalism does not get along well with high 
degree of social capital what might stir the picture as well. However, the distortion might be alleviated by expanding 
the number of observations. 
Table 3.Estimations for social regimes, KOFglob 
 tfp_socdem tfp_cons tfp_lib tfp_south tfp_trans 
rd .235*** .155*** .190** .00605 .155*** 
 (8.51) (6.40) (3.46) (0.40) (8.13) 
kofglob .273 .270* 1.232* .265** 1.165*** 
 (1.18) (2.01) (2.26) (3.25) (15.22) 
C -.328 0.0363 -4.336 .865** -3.991*** 
 (-.35) (.07) (-1.96) (2.88) (-14.60) 
N 68 93 32 76 181 
R2 .6609 .5150 .6261 .3318 .8552 
Notes: the dependent variable is tfp; *, **, and *** indicate parameters that are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; standard 
errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients; all estimation models contain fixed effects. 
Table 4 and Table 5 yieldmore detailed interference results for social regimes and the pooled sample of transition 
countries. In case of innovation-leading regimes, we omitted human capital mobility and FDI stock as they both 
emerged insignificant in the regressions. That makes sense as both are considered to be more important in the 
transition phase or more generally, for relatively innovation-scarce countries. As country becomes more active in 
own innovation production, human capital (measured here as university student mobility) seems not to find much 
logic in moving abroad and obtain knowledge there. The nature of FDI differs also considerably conditional onif 
they flow into innovation-intensive or innovation-scarce countries.FDI into innovation-scarce countries 
bringforeign, already developed technologies while investments into innovation-intensive countries spur domestic 
development of technologies and thus, impact of foreign capital inflows on TFP is not visible under FDI, but rather 
under R&D and patent data.   
Further toour results as demonstrated in Table 4 and Table 5, social capital stock captured in KOFsoc index is 
highly significant and large in magnitude in both social-democratic and conservative regime. The same applies to 
transition countries where the elasticity of KOFsoc accords with estimations of Ishise and Sawada (2009). The 
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elasticity of domestic R&D ranges from app. 0.04 (southern) through app. 0.1 (conservative) and app. 0.2 
(transition, social-democratic) to 0.419 (liberal regime). 
Table 4. Estimations for innovation-leading social regimes  
 tfp_socdem tfp_cons tfp_lib tfp_socdem tfp_cons tfp_lib 
rd .226*** .0982*** .419*** .130*** .0421 .417*** 
 (9.10) (3.49) (6.30) (3.90) (1.67) (6.25) 
kofsoc .325* .761*** -.776** .402** .694*** -.823** 
 (2.45) (4.03) (-2.80) (3.32) (3.43) (-2.91) 
impy   .201*** .107** .0899 
   (3.92) (2.99) (0.91) 
C -.491 -1.770* 3.164** 0.00839 -1.040 3.454** 
 (-.92) (-2.48) (3.38) (.02) (-1.18) (3.49) 
N 68 93 32 68 92 32 
R2 .6842 .5739 .6542 .7486 .7159 .6646 
Notes: the dependent variable is tfp; *, **, and *** indicate parameters that are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; standard errors 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficients; all estimation models contain fixed effects. 
Table 5. Estimations for innovation-lagging social regimes  
 tfp_south tfp_trans tfp_south tfp_trans tfp_south tfp_trans 
rd .0400** .245*** .0382* .206*** .0202 .178*** 
 (2.69) (10.18) (2.44) (9.97) (0.79) (10.40) 
kofsoc .0266 .746*** .0264 .546*** .195* .232** 
 (0.40) (7.31) (0.39) (6.14) (2.60) (2.95) 
impy   .0150 .379*** -.0155 .246*** 
   (0.40) (8.44) (-0.37) (5.94) 
fdistock   .00243 .055*** 
   (0.12) (3.89) 
hcm   -.132*** .086*** 
   (-4.22) (6.22) 
C 1.737*** -2.543*** 1.762*** -1.287*** 1.218*** -.151 
 (7.25) (-6.94) (7.07) (-3.77) (4.36) (-.52) 
N 76 181 76 181 57 154 
R2 .2298 .7382 .2316 .8168 .3467 .8757 
Notes: the dependent variable is tfp; *, **, and *** indicate parameters that are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; standard errors 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficients; all estimation models contain fixed effects. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper yields evidence of multiplication effect of technology flows spurred by globalization. Our approach 
suggests the technology conduits to be trade, foreign direct investments and human capital migration and to control 
for domestic R&D performance and social capital stock. We assume that impact of globalization takes also the form 
of social reaction to cultural collision, as well as form of increased access to international R&D funding. 
Nevertheless, proper isolation of these manifestations of globalization goes beyond the scope of this paper.   
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Analysis of panel data on selected EU and EFTA member and candidate countries employing the fixed effects 
estimator yields convincing results of positive and significant impact of globalization in overall, as well as in terms 
of particular conduits of technology transfer. The estimations justify the magnitude of the impact known from some 
earlier studies.    
After confronting innovation leaders and transition countries, we find lower (still positive though) evidence of 
overall globalization impact on social-democratic, conservative and southern regimes. In case of all these regimes, 
FDI stock and human capital mobility do not emerge as significant. Nonetheless, the impact of social capital as 
estimated is significant, positive and large even when controlling for import and R&D. 
Acknowledgements 
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the project VEGA No. 1/0340/11. 
References 
Abramovitz, M., 1986. Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind. Journal of Economic History 46, 386-406. 
Ahmed, E.M., 2012. Are the FDI inflow spillover effects on Malaysia's economic growth input driven? Economic Modelling 29(4), 1498-1504. 
Akçomak, I.S., terWeel, B., 2009. Social capital, innovation and growth: Evidence from Europe. European Economics Review 53, 544-567. 
Anwar, S., Nguyen, L.P., 2011. Foreign direct investment and trade: The case of Vietnam. Research in International Business and Finance 25, 39-
52. 
Barbosa, K.D., Eiriz T.W., 2009. Linking corporate productivity to foreign direct investment: An empirical assessment. International Business 
Review 18, 1-13. 
Bénassy, J.-P., Brezis, E., S. 2013. Brain drain and development traps. Journal of Development Economics 102, 15-22. 
Bottazzi, L., Peri, G., 2003. Innovation and spillovers in regions: Evidence from European patent data. European Economic Review 47 (4), 687-
710. 
Combes, P.-P., Miren, L., Mayer, T., 2005. The trade-creating effects of business and social networks: evidence from France. Journal of 
International Economics 66 (1), 1–29. 
Cuaresma, J.C., Havettova, M., Labaj, M., 2013. Income convergence prospects in Europe: Assessing the role of human capital dynamics. 
Economic Systems (in press), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2013.02.004. 
Damijan, J., Knell, M., Majcen, B., Rojec, M., 2003. Technology transfer through FDI in top-10 transition countries: how important are direct 
effects, horizontal and vertical spillovers? William Davidson Institute Working Paper 549, Ann Arbor, MI. 
Dreher, A., 2006. Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization. Applied Economics 38 (10), 1091-1110. 
Dreher, A., Sturm, J., Ursprung, H. W., 2008a. The impact of globalization on the composition of government expenditures: Evidence from the 
panel data. Public Choice 134, 263-292. 
Dreher, A., Gaston, N., Martens, P., 2008b. Measuring Globalisation, Gauging its Consequences. New York, Springer, 2008. 
Dujava, D., 2012. Causes Of Lagging Behind Of New Member States Of EU: Empirical Analysis By Montgomery Decomposition, 
Politickáekonomie, University of Economics, Prague 2, 222-244. 
Esping-Andersen, G., 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. New Yersey : Princeton University Press. 
Fagerberg, J., Srholec, M., 2008. National innovation systems, capabilities and economic development. Research Policy 37, 1417-1435. 
Fagerberg, J., Srholec, M., Verspagen, B., 2010. Innovation and Economic Development, in “Handbook of the Economics of Innovation – 
Volume 2“.In: Hall, B., Rosenberg, N. (Eds.). Elsevier, North Holland, pp. 793-829. 
Ferrera, M. 1996. The southern model of welfare in social Europe. Journal of European Social Policy 6 (1), 17-37. 
Ford, T. C., Rork, J. C., 2011. Why buy what you can get for free? The effect of foreign direct investment on state patent rates. Journal of Urban 
Economics 68, 72-81. 
Gemmel, N., Kneller, R., Sanz, I., 2008. Foreign investment, international trade and the size and structure of public expenditures. European 
Journal of Political Economy 24, 151-171. 
Gould, D.M., 1994. Immigrant links to the home country: empirical implications for U.S. bilateral trade flows. Review of Economics and 
Statistics 76, 302–316. 
Hanousek, J., Kocenda, E., Maurel, M., 2011. Direct and indirect effects of FDI in emerging European markets: A survey and meta-analysis. 
Economic Systems 35(3), 301-322. 
Heidenreich, M., 2003. Regional inequalities in the enlarged Europe. Journal of European Social Policy 13 (4), 313-333. 
Irsova, Z., Havranek, T., 2013. Determinants of horizontal spillovers from FDI: evidence from a large meta-analysis. World Development 42, 1-
15.  
Ishise, H., Sawada, Y., 2009. Aggregate returns to social capital: Estimates based on the augmented augmented-Solow model. Journal of 
Macroeconomics 31, 376-393. 
Javorcik, B., Ozden, C., Spatareanu, M., Neagu, C., 2011. Migrant networks and foreign direct investment. Journal of Development Economics 
94, 231-241. 
552   Paula Puskarova /  Procedia Economics and Finance  20 ( 2015 )  544 – 552 
Javorcik, B., Spatareanu, M., 2008. To share or not to share: Does local participation matter for spillovers from foreign direct investment? Journal 
of Development Economics 85, 194-217. 
Keller, W., 2010. International trade, foreign direct investment, and technology spillovers, in “Handbook of the Economics of Innovation – 
Volume 2“. In: Hall, B., Rosenberg, N. (Eds.). Elsevier, North Holland, pp. 793-829. 
Kemeny, T., 2010. Does Foreign Direct Investment Drive Technological Upgrading? World Development 38(11), 1543–1554. 
Kose, M.A., Prasad, E.S., Terrones, M.E., 2009. Does openness to international financial flows raise productivity growth? Journal of 
International Money and Finance 28(4), 554-580. 
Krammer, M. S. S., 2013. Assessing the relative importance of multiple channels for embodied and disembodied technological spillovers. 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.02.006, in press 
Lundvall, B.-A., 2010. National Systems of Innovation: Toward a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning. Anthem Press, New York.  
Mendi, P., 2007. Trade in disembodied technology and total factor productivity in OECD countries. Research Policy 36, 121-133 
Miller, S.M., Upadhyay, M.P., 2000. The effects of openness, trade orientation, and human capital on total factor productivity. Journal of 
Development Economics 63, 399–423. 
Puskarova, P., 2012. Innovation performance of V4 countries, in “EDAMBA 2012: proceedings of international scientific conference for doctoral 
students and young researchers: 22nd November, 2012 Bratislava“. In:Machová, M., Petianová, A. (Eds.). Publishing House EKONÓM, 
Bratislava, pp. 972-985. 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., Trebbi, F., 2004. Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic 
development. Journal of Economic Growth 9, 131-165. 
Simonen, J., McCann, P., 2008. Firm innovation: the influence of R&D cooperation and the geography of human capital inputs. Journal of Urban 
Economics 64, 146–154. 
Soukiazis, E., Antunes, M., 2012. Foreign Trade, Human Capital and Economic Growth: An Empirical Approach for the EU Countries. The 
Journal of International Trade & Economic Development: An International and Comparative Review 21 (1), 3-24.  
Teixeira, A., Fortuna, N., 2010. Human capital, R&D, trade, and long-run productivity.Testing the technological absorption hypothesis for the 
Portuguese economy, 1960-2001. Research Policy 39(3), 335-350. 
Woo, J., 2009. Productivity growth and technological diffusion through foreign direct investment. Economic Inquiry 47(2), 226-248. 
